本文主要探討當企業執行長本身具有高聲譽時,是否因此企業會有相對應較佳的經營績效故先透過文獻討探得知執行長聲譽如何衡量及企業研發支出市場評價及未來營運績效關聯。透過檢驗兩個議題「執行長聲譽愈高的公司是否會投入愈多的研發支出?」以及「研發支出與未來績效的關聯性,是否受執行長聲譽影響?」,進一步探討執行長聲譽、研發支出與未來績效之間的關係。本研究西元2001年到2010年間美國上市公司作為本次研究對象,觀察值共計1,598個,並利用「執行長的重要商業媒體引用數」、「執行長的經營效率值」及「計算執行長前三年任期期間產業調整後總資產報酬率的平均數」三個代理變數來捕捉驗證。經實證結果,當執行長聲譽愈高時,公司研發支出投入密集度將會愈高;但是當若公司執行長非高聲譽者,則公司投入研發支出之多寡對公司未來績效不一定會有正面影響。
This paper investigates the relationship between CEO reputation and firm’s R&D investments and its subsequent performance. CEOs with high reputations have incentives to protect their reputations by enhancing their firms’ investment efficiency, thereby increasing performance. However, highly reputed CEOs can become distracted as a result of their notoriety and resort to rent-seeking behavior (e.g., earnings management), thereby using R&D as reputation-building tool. Using multiple proxies for CEO reputation, we find that firms with highly reputed CEOs are associated with higher R&D intensity, suggesting that CEOs act to protect their reputations by increasing the investment in intangible assets. We also show that CEO reputation enhances the association between R&D and future operating performance. Overall, our paper provides empirical evidence on the economic consequences associated with CEO characteristics.