美國法上行政特權之研究-兼論我國法制與實務

A Study on American Executive Privilege – And Its Applications In Taiwan.

蔡德倫(Der-Lun Tsai)

指導教授 ： 李建良

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2008年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2008.02384

摘要

中文摘要
本篇論文主要在討論行政特權，而以行政特權的發源地—美國為主，首先界定所謂行政特權在定義上的範圍如何，與國家機密特權的區別何在；以及在學理上反對與支持行政特權的理由。
之後進入美國法的介紹，在行政權與立法權之間，以美國華盛頓總統開始到現任的小布希總統，兩百多年間行政部門與國會之間所發生資訊拒絕例子，整理討論行政特權主張時主體與客體，國會的回應如何，立法規範的可能性，初步提出的小結則是應該透過權力的制衡。
在行政權與司法權之間，則是介紹美國最高法院的重要判決，包括Totten原則、國家機密特權、總統通訊特權等等，討論其延生問題，例如特權主張的推定效力與絕對效力、法院密室審查的依據與方式、特權主張在民事程序與刑事程序的差異性；這裡提出的小結則是應該建立完整的司法審查制度。
進入我國法的部分，首先建構我國行政特權的概念，針對兩個主要的大法官解釋585號與627號，分析討論行政特權的定義、私人持有行政資訊的情形可否主張行政特權、行政特權發生爭議時的解決方式、檢察官行保密程序的適格性；提出初步結論是我國行政特權是廣泛的、相對的憲法權力。
在其他憲法權力的制衡上，立法權部分，除了善用大法官所提出的合理協商途徑解決行政特權爭議外，建立司法機制的可能，本文則是採較為保守的立場；在具體的立法建議上，主要分析立法規範行政特權的可能性以及鼓勵藐視國會的立法。
在司法權部分，以我國現行相關程序法，例如刑事訴訟法、民事訴訟法、行政訴訟法以及軍事審判法等，一一檢視是否具有拒絕證言與文書拒絕提出等資訊拒絕規範依據、並認為拒絕證言與文書提供應該制訂概括條款，法院裁定後的救濟途徑如何、聲請救濟範圍的擴張建議、特權主張的推定效力以及相對效力在我國的適用可能；也針對法院密室審查進行討論與審查前應該賦予程序保障，當然理想的設計當然也是建立完整的司法審查制度。
最後介紹的是，我國的監察權與考試權，考試權實質上是獨立機關但欠缺具體制衡手段，當與行政特權遭遇時，可以參考大法官解釋所提出的合理協商途徑以及司法機制；同時也討論考試院是否為行政特權的主體。
監察權因為欠缺有效制衡手段，也只能依循合理協商途徑以及司法機制；此外，也針對現行監察法與憲法不一致的地方一一討論。

關鍵字：行政特權、國家機密特權、民主正當性、總統通訊特權、推定效力、相對效力。

關鍵字

行政特權 ； 國家機密特權 ； 民主正當性 ； 總統通訊特權 ； 推定效力 ； 相對效力。

並列摘要

Abstract
Though our constitution does not specifically provide for the presidential “Executive Privilege”. In this thesis, we tried to introduce “Executive Privilege” with American experience.
Second charter is to decide that what the Executive Privilege means and how wide the range of it is. We discuss the difference between Executive Privilege and State-Secrets Privilege by listing many opinions of scholars, and finally suggest that State –Secrets Privilege shall be a part of Executive privilege.
In third charter, starting from Washington President’s “St.Clair”, ending up with George W• Bush’s the firing of Attorneys. 200 more years’ practice, the Executive and the Congress follow an easy but unclear rule to run executive privilege. We conclude that most of the privilege claims are based on the separation of powers doctrine or “public good interests”. Sill we suggest that the Congress shall use their own “weapon”, which was conferred by Constitution.
In the Fourth charter, we discuss many famous cases in Supreme Court, such as Arron Burr’s Treason(1807)、Totten Doctrine(1875)、The Reynolds(1953),and the Nixon’s Presidential privilege(1974). There are still other issues, like “The demand of due process of law in civil and criminal process.” ”Whether the claim of Presidential privilege is presumed to be true.” “Once State-Secrets Privilege is properly claimed, it won’t be interrupted by any further evidence demands or important public interests.” We found it necessary to establish a complete judicial review in court to police the executive privilege.
In the fifth charter, we tried to build the concept of Executive privilege in Taiwan. Illustrating the municipal Executive privilege with two important J.Y.Interpretations: the no.627 and no.585. We concluded that according to the present Interpretations , the concept of Executive privilege in Taiwan would be wide and limited as a kind of constitutional power. And such analysis do accord with the ideal type of Executive privilege.
In the sixth charter, we suggest policing the executive privilege with constitutional means. Congress should seek reasonable channels to negotiate and settle their differences, or establish applicable requirements and procedures by law. We disapprove that shaping Executive privilege by congress’s law making. But we agree that Congress shall tried to provide for the contempt of congress in order to prevent the misuse of privilege. The court shall establish a complete judicial review to police privilege and we found that present some of procedure laws lack basis of privilege and suggest the modification..
The Examination Yuan is indeed an independent agency of constitutionality. Because lacking of meaningful constitutional policing means , The Examination Yuan shall only follow the rule of J.Y.Interpretations no. 585 when meeting with Executive privilege from the Government. And Examination Yuan is indeed a Executive Branch, there are suggestions that Examination Yuan shall have the privilege as the government do.
The Control Yuan lacks useful policing method ,too. Control Yuan shall seek reasonable channels to negotiate and settle their differences, or establish applicable requirements and procedures by law when meeting with Executive privilege from the Government.
Keyword: 「Executive Privilege」、「State-Secrets Privilege」、「Separation of powers」、「Arron Burr」、「Totten」、「Reynolds」、「Presidential privilege」

並列關鍵字

Executive Privilege ； State-Secrets Privilege ； Separation of powers ； Arron Burr ； Totten ； Reynolds ； Presidential privilege

參考文獻

王瑜玲，「論新聞從業人員之拒絕證言權」，台灣大學法律研究所碩士論文（2006）。

范立達，「記者拒絕證言權之研究」，台灣大學政治研究所碩士論文（2007）。

財團法人國家政策研究基金會，楊泰順，『立法規範藐視國會罪刻不容緩』，

Breckenridge Adam Carlyle ,The executive privilege; Presidential control over information, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press[1974].

Fisher Louis, In the name of national security : unchecked presidential power and the Reynolds case, University Press of Kansas[2006].