本研究旨在探討台灣銀行業的公司治理特性、關係人交易與銀行經營績效之關聯性,以2001年至2007 年橫斷面與時間序列之混合資料(Panel data analysis) 進行實證研究,並分別以兩階段最小平方法及動態Panel Data分析解決變數的內生性問題,及消除序列相關、殘差異質性、同時性(Simultaneity)等問題。研究結果發現: 一、當金融機構的最大股東存在控制權與現金流量權產生偏離與運用高度槓桿手法對董事會產生負的侵占效果時,最大股東通常為了謀取自身的利益,會有提高其成員擔任董、監事之席次、介入公司經營管理與決策制定的動機 二、控制股東控制董事會的能力越高,其越容易有能力和動機去通過關係人交易之決策,造成控制股東挪用或侵占公司資源的代理問題,以致對公司的價值產生負面價值。 我國公司治理存在不少漏洞,尤其內部人控制公司之現象極為嚴重,當控制股東占董事會席次越多時,董事會監督功能更其失效,造成透過關係人交易圖利自己及利害相關的企業,因此健全銀行的公司治理程度對其經營績效的確有正向影響
This study attempts to examine the structure of ownership, composition of board, and the connection between the related party transaction and the firm performance. Many empirical literatures on board composition, ownership structure and related party transactions just focus on firm valuation; they generally treat board composition and related party transactions as exogenous. But the recent studies argue that board composition is not an exogenous. In order to deal with endogeneity problem, this study applies two stage least square method and Dynamic Panel Data to deal with endogeneity, potential heteroskedasticity problems. This study assumes that board composition and related party transaction are endogenous variables. The sample banks used in this study are those banks listed in TSEC or OTC from 2003 to 2007. This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, the related party transaction, and corporate ownership structure. This paper contributes to the literature by taking into account of the endogeneity problem. We find that banks with corporate governance that are more effective in monitoring, advisory terms are better governed, and that better governance creates shareholder value.